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Abstract 
This thesis aims to study moral motivation in economic decision making and to increase 
understanding of how we treat the element of choice when it comes to economic inequality 
and distribution of income. Most people agree that inequality caused by differences in choice 
and effort is acceptable. We also accept inequality caused by luck if we take the risk by 
choice. On the other hand, we feel that inequalities caused by factors beyond our control 
should be redistributed to a considerable extent. But what about all the grey zones in 
between, all the different combinations of luck and choices? The starting point for this thesis 
is that there exist choice situations that are mere illusions – situations involving choice where 
the decision maker have little or no control over the outcome despite the freedom to choose. 
From psychological literature we also know that people have a tendency to exaggerate the 
control that choices provide. Combining these features, we are interested in to what extent 
people assign responsibility to more or less meaningless choices. 
This thesis analyses an economic experiment. In the experiment, a spectating dictator is 
asked to redistribute the total earnings of a two-person winner-takes-it-all lottery, where the 
detailed rules of the lottery vary across three different treatments. The results reveal that a 
choice illusion – luck that is covered up as a choice – in fact undermines the willingness to 
redistribute. Using a pure luck lottery as a baseline, we find that people transfer less from the 
lucky to the unlucky when an “empty” choice is introduced. We find that inequality is 
reduced substantially across all treatments, but that people redistribute less in the choice 
treatments. 
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1. Introduction 
What people consider distributive justice depends on what caused the initial inequality. Is 
Peter richer than Sara because he had better innate abilities, because he made a higher effort, 
or simply because he was lucky? Most people do in fact accept some inequality. Many agree 
that inequality caused by differences in choice and effort is acceptable. We also accept 
inequality caused by luck if we take the risk by choice. Further, we feel that inequalities 
caused by factors beyond our control should be redistributed to a considerable extent 
(Cappelen, et al., 2007; Almås, et al., 2010; Cappelen, et al., 2010; Cappelen, et al., 2011). 
An obvious example is income and wealth. Some struggle with low income and poverty 
because of genetic illnesses, poor innate abilities, or because they live in a community with 
few opportunities, while others have low disposable income because they are lazy, like to 
gamble, or choose to spend most of their time on leisure or other non-work activities. 
Differences in genetic health, innate abilities and the setting you are born into are difference 
in ex ante opportunities, that is, different starting points before any choices are made 
(Cappelen, et al., 2011). Differences in the ex post outcome can hence be due to different 
starting points, different luck,  different choices made, or different effort put in. But what 
about all the grey zones in between, all the different combinations of luck and choices?  
Psychological literature suggests that people have a tendency to exaggerate the  meaning of 
choices. Langer (1975) sheds light on what she calls the illusion of control. This 
phenomenon is defined as “an expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately 
higher than the objective probability would warrant” (Langer, 1975). Langer finds that 
choices, among other factors, causes people to believe that they can control or influence 
outcomes when they really cannot. Examples are the wish to choose one’s own lottery 
numbers or to roll the dice personally instead of letting someone else do it. Making these 
choices clearly does not increase the probability of winning, but this is what the illusion of 
control makes us believe.  
Having established that people assign choices importance concerning what is a fair 
distribution of resources and the acceptable level of inequality, and that we have a tendency 
to psychologically exaggerate the meaning of choices, this thesis aim to study whether we 
see people overrating the importance of choices in moral economic decision making. Should 
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all outcomes based on choices be one’s own responsibility, or are some choices not real 
choices as they provide no increased control over a given situation? And do we hold each 
other responsible for such meaningless choices?  
Cappelen, et al. (2011) have taken a closer look at these grey zones between luck and choice. 
In an experimental study, they looked at redistribution of income after a game where the 
participants could choose between a lottery and a safe option. An interesting finding from 
this study was the fact that the value of the safe option – representing the cost of avoiding 
risk – was not taken into account when people made redistributive choices between lucky 
and unlucky risk-takers. People were to a great extent held responsible for choosing risk, 
even when the alternative was a very poor safe option (like getting 25 kr with certainty 
instead of a lottery involving risk with an expected value of 400 kr). In this thesis, I have 
looked at the extreme version of this experiment. In addition to looking at redistribution in 
relation to the cost of avoiding a risky choice, I have looked at completely “empty” choices, 
so-called nominal choices where the different alternatives are essentially identical. Based on 
a new experiment conducted by scholars from The Choice lab at NHH, I have examined to 
what extent people distinguish between obvious pure luck lotteries and lotteries involving a 
choice, but which in reality represents luck covered up as a choice. I have looked at how 
spectators, who are not themselves participating in the particular lottery and whose payment 
is independent of their redistributive decisions, redistribute ex post between lucky and 
unlucky participants in groups who have been faced with different lottery situations as a 
payment for real work effort. Are the participants in the option groups to some extent held 
responsible for their choices even though they in reality have either no chance at all of 
affecting the outcome or only obtain control by accepting a highly unattractive alternative? 
The main research question of this thesis is therefore:  
“To what extent do we hold each other responsible for outcomes in situations 
involving a choice where the choice can be regarded as meaningless?” 
The experiment used for this thesis reveals that a choice illusion – luck that is covered up as 
a choice – in fact undermines the willingness to redistribute after a winner-takes-it-all 
lottery. Using a pure luck lottery as a baseline, we find that people transfer less from the 
lucky to the unlucky when a meaningless choice is introduced. Using a simple measure of 
inequality that takes values between 0 and 1 where 0 is perfect equality where both players 
are assigned the same amount and 1 means that one player gets all the earnings, we find that 
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inequality is reduced substantially across all treatments, but that people redistribute less in 
the choice treatments. This is evidence of people acknowledging the choice egalitarian 
argument, but suffering from a choice illusion. The effect is mainly driven by males. The 
distinction in inequality between the pure luck baseline and the choice treatments proves that 
we are not fully able to distinguish between choices that increase one’s control over a 
situation and choices that in reality are nothing but luck in moral economic decision making.  
Studying these questions and examining how theories about fairness, choice, risk and moral 
motivation relate to real choices made in real economic experiments can give important 
insights that can be of use in a range of settings. The most obvious is income and wealth 
inequalities. Welfare policy and wealth distribution has been on the political agenda for 
centuries, both nationally and internationally. The main question is to what extent people 
should be held responsible for all the factors affecting their income and wealth. In our 
society, there seems to be a discord between the liberal egalitarian view that welcomes more 
freedom of choice and that keeps people responsible for these choices, and the egalitarian 
attitude stating that economic inequality is negative for a society. Brief examples are pension 
fund schemes and the freedom to choose your own physician in Norway. Does adding 
freedom of choice in these matters really increase people’s control? For the man in the street 
these choices are more or less “empty”; he is in no position to make a qualified choice, often 
resulting in more or less random choices that he is later held responsible for.  
The ambition for this thesis is to contribute to the ongoing exploration of moral motivation 
and psychological mechanisms in economic decision making. A deeper understanding of 
what people consider a fair redistribution of wealth, how we treat the element of choice, and 
a better understanding of attitudes towards who should bear the cost of risk, will hopefully 
enrich our knowledge and enable us to make better systems and policies in society. On a 
general and more psychological level, this study aims to reveal nuances in what motivates 
human behavior. This is of interest to the general public as well as economists, social 
scientists and policy makers.  
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives a theoretical backdrop introducing the 
origin of behavioral economics, theories and empirical findings on moral motivation, 
concepts in moral attitudes to inequality, and the experimental approach in the field of 
economics. Chapter 3 presents the research design by describing the experiment and the 
rationale behind the features of the experiment. Chapter 4 presents the findings and analysis, 
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while chapter 5 concludes and briefly discusses policy implications. As the experimental 
analysis in chapter 4 is fairly simple and straightforward, I have chosen to put considerable 
weight on presenting and discussing theories and literature in chapter 2.  
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2. Theory 
This literature chapter serves as a backdrop for the empirical section and a point of departure 
for discussion and analysis throughout the thesis. First, I will briefly present the historical 
background and context of the field of behavioral economics in general and moral 
motivation in particular. Second, some concepts moral attitudes to inequality will be 
presented and discussed, before returning to modeling the motivation behind moral 
economic decision making for this particular experimental design. Finally follows a section 
on the experimental approach within the field of economics, including its properties and 
shortcomings.  
 
2.1 Historical background of behavioral economics 
Traditional economic theory assumes that decision makers behave like homo economicus – 
the economic man. The term first appeared in John Stuart Mill’s work on political economy 
dated back to 1836 (Persky, 1995), and basically means that all our economic decisions are 
completely rational and based exclusively on self-interest. Empirical evidence repeatedly 
proves that these assumptions fail. People donate to charity, share wealth with strangers, 
behave inconsistently over time and feel worse losing 100 kroner than they feel better 
winning 100 kr (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). To understand and structure these 
economically irrational characteristics of decision making, we need to take human 
psychology and sociology into account to a greater extent than traditional economic theory. 
The result is what we call behavioral economics, and researchers in this field often use the 
experimental approach to reveal true economic behavior.  
Traditional economic theory is based on some rather narrow assumptions about how humans 
behave when we make economic decisions. After all, it is what scientific models are all 
about; you make assumptions and simplify reality in order to make a model that can predict 
and give us information about different aspects of life. Some of these assumptions hold, 
some might fail entirely, while others only hold to a certain extent, but still manage to 
capture and explain given phenomena. Assumptions create models that are simplified 
versions of reality, being somewhat useful or completely meaningless. Assumptions make 
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models more or less stylized, depending on how many aspects of reality the model is able to 
take into account. 
What is really referred to when discussing traditional economic theory in this thesis, is neo-
classical economics. The neo-classical era of the early 20
th
 century followed the classical 
economists of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century, and is the basis of a substantial part of the economics 
that is taught around the world today (Schwartz, 2008). The classical economists actually did 
take some psychological considerations into account when developing their theories. In fact, 
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/1892), Adam Smith presents a number of 
principles of human psychology not yet developed by pure psychologists (Camerer & 
Loewenstein, 2003). The neo-classicists, on the other hand, ignored most other disciplines in 
their works (Schwartz, 2008). Psychology was just emerging as a science at that time, and 
economists hesitated taking it into their field fearing it was a foundation too unsteady for 
their analyses (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2003). They looked at economics more as a pure 
natural science, and established the foundation of the marketplace where agents’ self-interest 
naturally regulates price and quality (Smith, [1776] 2009).  
The term homo economicus first appears in, or rather in the wake of, the philosopher and 
political economist John Stuart Mill’s On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the 
Method of Investigation Proper To It (Persky, 1995). Here, Mill describes a decision maker 
that is completely rational and who is exclusively motivated by self-interest and the wish to 
possess wealth (Mill, 1836). He always prefers more over less, and he does not care about 
the welfare of others beyond what benefits himself. Further, he always behaves completely 
rational, and thus makes all economic decisions completely without emotional intervention. 
We all know from our everyday lives that we do not always behave like this. In fact, we 
make irrational choices all the time – often claimed to be predictably irrational (Ariely, 
2010) – and we do care about the welfare of others. This, however, does not mean that all 
economic models based on these classic assumptions are useless. To some extent we are 
both rational and motivated by self-interest. Thus, traditional economic theory and models 
can give us correct, useful and important insights, although it does not necessarily provide a 
complete picture of true economic behavior.  
One could have left it at that. Obviously one did not. Feeling an urge to continue where the 
classical economists of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries left off, economists in the mid-20
th
 century 
wanted to take the social sciences back into economics. In order to get a more accurate 
 17 
picture of reality, economists, psychologists, philosophers and other social scientists started 
examining how, why and to what extent psychology, sociology and other social sciences 
influence human decision making in the field of economics. This is what we today call 
behavioral economics. The field is closely related to experimental economics, whose 
development and theory I will return to in later chapters. Lab and field experiments have 
proved an appropriate approach when mapping true human behavior, and so the two fields of 
study have developed side by side in later decades (The Royal Swedish Academy of 
Sciences, 2002). Behavioral and experimental economics faced a breakthrough in 2002 when 
Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 
for their contribution to research in the field (The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 
2002). The fact that Kahneman is a psychologist winning the Nobel Prize in Economic 
Sciences reflects how interdisciplinary the fields are. In the decades prior to this 
breakthrough, behavioral and experimental economics were recognized more as an “amusing 
sideline, not really as a serious contribution to the field of economics” (Sugden, 2010). 
Today, the fields are flourishing. As measured by publications in important journals and new 
doctoral dissertations, behavioral and experimental economics are among the most active 
fields in economics (The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2002).  
 
2.2 Moral motivation 
 
Economists tend to focus on equity when they talk about fairness. (…) we got to get away 
from that. Fairness means a lot more than (…) equity. It’s about the rules of the game. 
        
Professor Bart Wilson, Chapman University 
 
 
Aside from bounded rationality, non-economic motivation is an important modification of 
the economic man and one of the main topics in behavioral economics. Non-economic 
motivation can be based on either social or moral aspects, and this thesis will concentrate on 
the latter. Two classical games serve as an introduction to this section on moral motivation. 
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The ultimatum game 
The ultimatum game is a stylized game situation first presented in Güth, Schmittberger and 
Schwarze in 1982 (Bearden, 2001). It consists of two players, let us call them A and B, and a 
sum of money or another good, let us say 100 kr. Player A is then to divide the sum of 
money between himself and player B. Player B can either accept the offer and both players 
keep whatever the amounts player A decided, or he can decline and none of them get 
anything. Traditional game theory says that player B prefers more over less and therefore 
that he will accept any offer greater than zero. As player A also prefers more over less, he is 
motivated to keep as much as possible to himself. The solution is consequently that player A 
will give away the smallest amount possible that is greater than zero, 1 kr, and keep 99 kr to 
himself. Player B will then accept as 1 > 0.  
This is not what happens in real ultimatum games. Several studies have examined real 
behavior in this game, and most find that the players do not act according to neo-classical 
game theory (Bearden, 2001). The concept of fairness seems to be prevalent to a 
considerable extent. The players share the sum of money more equally than explained by 
neo-classical game theory. Player B usually finds being assigned 1 kr unfair and will not 
accept. The result is then less money, but at least the outcome is fair as both players get 0 kr. 
The question is how much money player B is willing to “pay” for fairness. He faces a trade-
off between receiving money, but being treated unfairly, and receiving no money, but 
reaching a fair outcome and at the same time punish player A for his unfair suggestion. 
Player A will thus be motivated by self-interest, fairness considerations and the fear of 
player B rejecting the offer. Thus he offers more than 1 kr. Whether the outcome is a 80/20, 
60/40 or 50/50 split, the conclusion is the same: Real ultimatum games prove that humans 
take fairness considerations into account in economic decision making. 
The dictator game 
A similar, but simpler game is the dictator game. Actually, it is not really a game as much as 
a single-person decision scenario. Two players are assigned a sum of money. Like above, let 
us imagine that players A and B get 100 kr. Player A is the dictator and can divide the 
money however he prefers. The players are anonymous, do not know each other and only 
play the game once. Player B can only accept, so player A’s assignment is the final outcome 
of the game.  
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As in the ultimatum game, traditional game theory suggests that player A is to keep as much 
as possible. In the dictator game, this means keeping all the money. And, as in the ultimatum 
game, experiments show that we do not act that way (Engel, 2010). More than a hundred 
dictator game experiments have been carried out and published over the last three decades, 
and the results show great variation (ibid). However, most studies, including Engel’s meta 
study (2010), easily conclude that people do in fact give money to the other player even if 
they do not have any economic incentives to do so. Like in the ultimatum game, fairness 
considerations are taken into account to a considerable extent in distribution situations.  
This thesis studies a variant of the dictator game where the dictator is a third party and not 
one of the two players. Also, the money that is to be distributed is earnings after a real work 
effort task, and in addition the money is preliminary distributed by a lottery. I will return to 
this in later sections after presenting the concept of fairness ideals and the illusion of control.  
 
2.3 Fair and unfair inequality 
In order to answer the question about which inequalities should be corrected and which are 
acceptable morally and theoretically, we have to search in philosophical literature about 
fairness and distributive justice. What is fair and what is unfair inequality depends on what 
caused the initial inequality and what kind of fairness ideal people have (Lamont & Favor, 
2008). A fairness ideal is a sort of mindset describing what a person finds fair and unfair in 
principle. Normally, unequal distribution is caused by differences in luck, effort, innate 
abilities, choices or a combination of these factors. Luck and innate abilities are often 
considered factors beyond individual control. Effort and choice, on the other hand, is usually 
determined by the individual itself. Still people differ in opinions on what factors one should 
be held responsible for, and what factors one should not have to bear the consequences of. 
Some consider all inequality unfair, while others argue that inequality due to for instance 
difference in effort should not be redistributed. Some find inequality caused by difference in 
innate talents and abilities unfair, while others oppose this view. In philosophy we find quite 
a few different theoretical fairness ideals, presented in the following brief review. 
The strict egalitarian fairness ideal refers to the belief that everybody should have the same 
wealth regardless of all factors (Lamont & Favor, 2008). People should not be held 
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responsible for neither talent nor effort. That means that inequalities in ex post outcomes 
should be evened out no matter what the origin of the inequality is. We find this view in 
political ideologies such as communism and Marxism (Arneson, 2009). A different view is 
the libertarian view. Libertarians claim that distributive justice is that each person is entitled 
to whatever wealth he or she earns or produces. This view states that individuals are 
responsible for both talent and effort, and also that people are entitled to enjoy the wealth 
obtained through luck. A libertarian will give the individual the benefits of traits such as 
innate abilities. If a person is born smart and talented and experience success because of this, 
he should be the one who reaps the fruits. In between these opposing views we find liberal 
egalitarianism (Cappelen, et al., 2007). The followers of this view believe that a person is 
responsible for the effort put in to obtain wealth, but not for the talent. Ergo, inequality in 
wealth due to differences in effort is acceptable, but inequality caused by different initial 
abilities and talents should be evened out because it is beyond the individual’s control. 
Fourth, meritocrats hold people responsible for all factors related to personal traits, 
regardless of whether it is talent or effort. Educational reward systems such as common 
grading systems are based on this view. An examiner does not care whether your 
performance is caused by hard work or initial abilities; the only thing that matters is the 
results. 
A fifth fairness ideal is choice egalitarianism. This holds people responsible for their 
choices, but not for their luck (Cappelen, et al., 2011). This means that choice egalitarianism 
and liberal egalitarianism might overlap in some situations, if talent is characterized as luck 
and effort is determined by choice. The motivation behind a choice egalitarian view might be 
that in a group wherein wealth is redistributed, like a welfare society or an organization, 
people should not have to give up some of their obtained wealth because another person 
made a bad choice. Also, the person making the choice could be tempted to not make a 
thoughtful decision, because he knows that if he makes a bad choice, he will be insured by 
others who made better choices. If this was the case, no one would have the incentive to 
make good choices. One area of study where this ideal is put into use is in contract theory 
with principal-agent problems. Here, it is claimed that whoever is in a better position to 
influence risk, should bear the risk. Contract designers take microeconomic theory and 
knowledge about incentives into account when making efficient contracts. Contracts should 
be designed such that the one who determines the effort is the residual claimant (Mathiesen, 
2010). The wedding planner, not the wedding couple, should bear the cost of exceeding the 
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wedding budget as it is the wedding planner, and not the wedding couple, who is in a better 
position to manage the wedding costs. Otherwise, the wedding planner would not have 
incentives to act according to the budget, and the wedding couple could end up with costs far 
bigger than expected without being able to control it.  
The main interesting question is what real world factors that people believe that individuals 
should be held responsible for. Any outcome is determined by a set of factors. One example 
is individual pre-tax income, which is determined by factors such as age, gender, family 
background, number of hours worked, years of education, discipline of education, whether 
the person works in the private or public sector and country of residence (Almås, et al., 
2011). Which of these factors should be in the responsibility set? That is, where to draw the 
responsibility cut? A prominent view in our society is that of choice egalitarians and liberal 
egalitarians, stating that one should be held responsible for factors under one’s control, but 
not for factors beyond one’s control (Cohen, 1989). That leads us to the next question of 
what is under one’s control or not. This thesis is interested in studying the nuances of the 
notion of responsibility, keeping in mind the illusion of control. The illusion of control is a 
theory from psychology by Langer (1975) claiming that people have a tendency to 
exaggerate the meaning of choices, defined as “an expectancy of a personal success 
probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant” (Langer, 
1975). Langer finds that choices, among other factors, causes people to believe that they can 
control or influence outcomes when they really cannot. An example is a result from one of 
Langer’s experiments saying that we value a lottery ticket with our own chosen numbers 
higher than a ticket with randomly chosen numbers.  
Cappelen, Sørensen & Tungodden (2010) tried to map what people actually hold each other 
responsible for among the factors price, working time and productivity in an experiment with 
a distribution phase following a production phase. They found that people, at large, do not 
hold each other responsible for the randomly assigned price which was obviously beyond 
individual control. They did, however, hold each other responsible for working time and 
productivity. Whether the participants chose to work 10 minutes or 30 minutes was 
determined at the individual level, and holding people responsible for this is hence in 
accordance with the liberal egalitarian view or the choice egalitarian view. When it comes to 
productivity, measured by how many words the participants were able to type correctly 
during the working time, a factor considered beyond individual control by the scholars, they 
found that people in fact do hold each other responsible for this. This is interesting. Both 
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price and productivity is considered beyond individual control, still most people hold each 
other responsible for productivity, but not price. The scholars conclude in the following way: 
Our preferred interpretation of this finding is that for many of our participants, the 
core distinction when drawing the responsibility cut was not between choices and 
circumstances, but between impersonal and personal factors. (Cappelen, Sørensen & 
Tungodden, 2010, p. 440) 
Another interesting study revealing how people treat the notion of choice is that of Savani & 
Rattan (2012). Through six experiments, they find that priming (American) people on the 
concept of choice increases the acceptance and maintenance of wealth inequality. Their 
hypothesis was that being reminded of the concept of choice activates the belief that 
outcomes in life are a determined by personal agency and not from outside, uncontrollable 
factors. This leads to justification of economic inequality. They primed their treatment group 
by asking them to list four choices they made yesterday prior to questions about inequality, 
in contrast to the control group which was asked to list four things they did yesterday prior to 
the same questions on inequality. Their hypothesis proved correct and Savani & Rattan 
conclude as follows:  
(…)when choice is highlighted, people are less disturbed by facts about the existing 
wealth inequality in the U.S., more likely to underestimate the role of societal factors 
in individuals’ successes, less likely to support the redistribution of educational 
resources, and less likely to tax the rich even to resolve a government budget deficit 
crisis. (Savani & Rattan, 2012, p. 2) 
This study was carried out in America where the notion of choice is important and highly 
valued (Savani & Rattan, 2012), and one can discuss to what extent we would come to the 
same conclusions outside the U.S. Nonetheless, the study reveals an interesting mechanism 
in the attitudes towards distributive justice and the role of choice.  
Yet another tendency in distributive justice is uncovered by Barr, et al. (2012). They 
conclude that relatively well-off people take differences in effort and productivity into 
account when redistributing to a greater extent than relatively poor people do. By running a 
four-person dictator game with two treatments – one where the initial allocation was random 
and one where the initial allocation reflected relative performance in a production phase – 
they found that well-off people redistribute differently according to whether the initial 
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allocation was random or a result of performance, while poor people did not. To increase 
generalizability, the researchers carried out the experiment both in Oxford, UK and Cape 
Town, South Africa. The same conclusion was drawn for both locations. This study suggests 
that there are socio-economic differences in acknowledgement of effort and productivity. It 
remains for further research to establish whether the same differences apply to 
acknowledgement of choices.  
 
2.4 The motivation function 
We have concluded that both self-interest and fairness considerations affect humans in 
economic decision making. Depending on the fairness ideal a person prefers, he will 
consciously or unconsciously maximize his utility. The concept of utility functions is 
assumed known in this thesis. His utility is still increasing in income, but it is at the same 
time decreasing in deviation from his fairness ideal. The optimal allocation thus depends on 
the weight a person gives to income and fairness considerations and the fairness ideal 
(Cappelen, et al., 2007). The more he cares about his own income, the more he will allocate 
to himself. The more he cares about fairness, the closer to the perceived fair allocation he 
will distribute the money. In a simple dictator game, where the sum of money that is to be 
distributed is simply given to the players rather than them working to earn it, the utility 
function – or motivation function – will look something like the following (Cappelen, et al., 
2007; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000): 
                
  
 
     
          
where   is the sum of money that is to be divided and    is person  ’s payment.    is the 
weight   puts on his own income and    is the weight he puts on fairness considerations. 
      represents  ’s fairness ideal, hence          is what person   in principle thinks is his 
fair payment. Given an interior solution, the optimal allocation is 
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The optimal solution depends on person  ’s fairness ideal and the weight he puts on income 
and fairness considerations. In a simple dictator game where none of the players have 
worked to earn the money, most will find an equal distribution the most fair,             
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). Thus, this game does not reveal much about fairness ideals, nor 
does it reflect most real life distributive situations. In society, the goods that are to be 
distributed are usually a result of production, not “manna from heaven” (Cappelen et al., 
2007). To better study what fairness ideals people support, some experiments include a 
production phase prior to the distribution phase (ibid). In the production phase the 
participants are asked to work on a certain task for a given or optional period of time. By 
working on a task, the participants feel that they are entitled to some form of compensation, 
as opposed to “free money” that can be considered a bonus rather than something they have 
a right to claim. By introducing a production phase, experimenters can provoke, identify and 
analyze the dictators’ motivation. Manipulating the production phase in different ways 
allows for uncovering different mechanisms in the distribution phase. Examples of 
manipulations are optional working time, randomized differences in wages, and paying 
according to productivity. Optional working time opens up for differences in choice and 
effort. Randomized differences in wages introduce an element of impersonal luck, while 
paying according to productivity reveals the element of talent or innate abilities. All these 
factors affect what we consider a fair distribution of income. 
A version of this distributive situation is one where the person who is given the task of 
redistribution is not himself one of the players. The experiment in this thesis is based on this 
version. Consider an experiment where two players, A and B, have been working on a task, 
and then a third party spectator, player C, is to distribute the earnings between A and B. C’s 
own payment will not depend on the redistributive choice he makes for A and B, and thus 
his own payment and the weight he puts on it is left out of the equation. Still an anonymous 
experiment, the factor left to explain C’s redistribution decision is his fairness ideal, given 
that he knows how the initial allocation of earnings came to be:  
    
                 
The above equation shows what factors affect C’s redistributive decision. We assume that all 
factors that affect an outcome can be categorized as effort, choice, luck or talent.   is the 
total earnings that are to be distributed, and   depends on player A and B’s effort ( ), 
choices ( ), luck ( ) and talent ( ) where            and                . However, in this 
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experiment, all participants worked for 30 minutes, so the effort is the same for everyone. 
Also, a participant’s number of correct sentences completed is unknown to everyone. 
Productivity, reflecting talent, is thereby unidentifiable. Eliminating these factors and 
translating the described fairness ideals strict egalitarianism (SE), libertarianism (L), liberal 
egalitarianism (LE) and choice egalitarianism (CE) into formal equations, we get the 
following (developed from Cappelen, et al., 2007 and Cappelen, et al., 2011) 
 
            
      
 
 
 
                    
 
            
      
 
 
 
              
      
 
          
                 
  
 
For the SE ideal, the total earnings are divided equally among the two players regardless all 
factors. For the L ideal, there is no redistribution and player   keeps whatever he earned 
regardless how he earned it. For LE, a player is entitled to a share of the total earnings that 
equals his share of the total effort as liberal egalitarians believe that people should be held 
responsible for effort, but not talent or luck. If effort is the same for both players, as in the 
experiment used in this thesis, the fair distribution is an equal split. Concerning the choice 
egalitarian (CE) ideal, player A and B are entitled to an equal share of the total earnings if 
they have made all the same choices. If they differ in choice, they are held responsible for 
that, and are entitled to whatever they have managed to earn individually.  
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2.5 Experimental economics 
2.5.1 The experimental approach 
Half a century ago, the experiment as a scientific method was predominantly reserved for 
medicine, the natural sciences and to a certain extent psychology (Cappelen & Tungodden, 
2012). Consensus among economists was that the experimental approach could not be 
applied in the field of economics. Scholars like John Stuart Mill, Lionel Robbins and Milton 
Friedman all opposed the use of laboratory experiments in economics, followed by Richard 
Lipsey concluding that “it is rarely, if ever, possible to conduct controlled experiments with 
the economy” (Guala, 2005). The opponents’ arguments were that one could not test 
economic hypotheses in laboratory experiments because labs could never control for all 
factors influencing decisions and thus not mimic real life situations. Today, experimental 
economics is one of the most flourishing fields in economics. By now, the experiment has 
indeed proved to be a useful tool in testing economic theories and hypotheses. An example is 
the previously mentioned dictator game where traditional game theory claims that the 
dictator will keep all the money, whereas numerous experiments show the opposite (Engel, 
2010).  
The use of experiments has been crucial for the development of behavioral economics 
(Cappelen & Tungodden, 2012). Experiments, carried out either in the field or in the lab, 
allow scholars to question economic models by showing what people actually do in contrast 
to what theory predicts they ought to do. Experimental findings either extend normative 
theories with descriptive empirics or refute the theory altogether. Where theoretical models 
fail to capture all mechanisms active in a scenario, real world data contains too much noise 
to say anything about causal effects, and surveys only give normative information on 
attitudes or behavior, the controlled laboratory experiment allows us to study true economic 
behavior and to establish causal relationships. True economic behavior is induced by 
monetary incentives. Most economic experiments use real money rewards in order to mimic 
real life situations and in that way uncover true behavior, and the participants usually know 
how much money is at stake (Cappelen & Tungodden, 2012). The laboratory experiment has 
two features that are particularly advantageous for establishing causal relationships: The 
ability to create a controlled environment where nothing but the variable of interest varies 
(Falk & Heckman, 2009), and randomization.  
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An outcome, decision, or a way of behaving can be caused by a range of factors. Studying 
real events or behavior, identifying what factors actually caused the outcome can be 
challenging and lead to speculative or spurious conclusions. The real world often has too 
much “noise” to study pure, causal effects. In a controlled lab experiment, however, all these 
other factors can be controlled for. If we believe that self-interest affects a person’s decisions 
and we originally want to study the prevalence of moral motivation, we can manipulate the 
experiment by letting the distributor’s own payment be independent of his decision. If we 
believe that social status or image affects a person’s decisions and we originally want to 
study the prevalence of self-interest, we can manipulate the experiment by letting all 
decisions be anonymous. The manipulative control a lab setting facilitates, allows us to 
operate in a less “noisy” research environment.  
A second favorable feature of the economic experiment is the fact that it allows 
randomization which again lets us establish causal relationships, and not just correlation 
(Cappelen & Tungodden, 2012). Identifying correlating variables is fairly straightforward for 
any kind of data, but it is often hard to tell which is the cause and which is the effect. 
Identifying causality is for obvious reasons preferable when trying to understand 
mechanisms in the economy and in the world at large. Imagine we have real world data 
showing a positive correlation between health and income; the higher the income, the better 
the health condition. Does this mean that high income causes good health, that good health 
leads to higher income, or is there a third factor affecting both income and health, like 
general abilities and sense? In controlled experiments, it is possible to ensure that all other 
possible factors that could influence the dependent variable, except the variable of interest, 
are equal among two groups (ibid). By letting the two groups be equal regarding observable 
characteristics, one can easier identify how the variable of interest affects the dependent 
variable. If we for instance suspect that age affects health and/or income, we can look at two 
groups within the same age interval to rule out the age effect. Furthermore, it is also possible 
to design an experiment such that we can assume randomization on non-observable factors 
as well. Imagine a group of people who are randomly drawn from a sample and given a 
treatment while the rest of the sample is not. The group given the treatment is called the 
treatment group, while the rest serves as the control group. Since the treatment is the only 
factor that separates the two groups, one can establish that any differences between the two 
groups are caused by the treatment.  
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To illustrate this logic formally, I use the framework of Deaton (2010, pp. 437-439). Here,   
represents treatment.    is hence   if individual   is in the treatment group and   if he is in 
the control group.    denotes the outcome for individual  , and is divided into     if   is in the 
treatment group and    if   is in the control group. What we are interested in is the difference 
in outcome caused by the treatment,            . From the experimental data we observe the 
average outcome in the treatment group and the control group,             and 
           . By manipulating the difference                           like below, we 
are able to reach the desired causal effect: 
                                  
                                      
                                       
So far, we have simply added and subtracted the same term,                . As we see, the 
second bracket term now cancels out as the expected outcome for the control group is the 
same whether treatment is given to the treatment group or not. Thus, we are left with 
                                  
                                     
which can be abbreviated to 
                                  
                       
This is an estimated treatment effect among the treated, but because treatment is the only 
thing that separates the treatment and control groups, it is also an estimated treatment effect 
for all. These simple, but convenient properties of the economic experiment makes it a 
powerful tool for estimating causal relationships.  
2.5.2 Shortcomings and critics of the experimental approach 
Despite the obvious benefits of the economic experiment, there are still reasons to hesitate 
relying solely on its conclusions.  
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The main concern regarding the economic experiment is its external validity and 
generalizability. This means to what extent the conclusions from an experimental study 
apply to the world outside the lab, to other settings or populations (Campbell & Stanley, 
1963). Several properties of the economic experiment contribute to undermining the extent 
to which the results can be generalized:  
The Hawthorne effect 
The Hawthorne effect refers to the idea that the participant’s awareness of being a part of an 
experiment affects his behavior in the experiment (Jones, 1992). This means that had he 
acted in the real world or not known he was a part of an experiment, he might have behaved 
differently, and the experimental results do not necessarily reveal genuine economic 
behavior. 
Lack of representativeness 
If the sample in an experiment has different characteristics than a greater population, the 
sample is not representative for that population. Thus, the conclusions drawn from the 
experiment cannot necessarily be directly transferred to the other population. One example is 
student samples. So far, many economic experiments have typically been conducted on 
undergraduate business students as this group is usually the most convenient group to reach 
for scholars (Cappelen & Tungodden, 2012). As students for many reasons have different 
characteristics than, say, the population of Norway as a whole, knowledge obtained through 
such experiments do not necessarily apply to the general public. Another example is 
representativeness across national borders or across socio-economic groups. Results from an 
experiment conducted in the United States will not necessarily comply with results from the 
exact same experiment carried out in Russia. Similarly, experiments carried out in urban 
areas might not show the same results as if the experiment was carried out in a rural district.  
Excluding influential emotions 
Milton Friedman claimed that “we can seldom test particular predictions in the social 
sciences by experiments designed explicitly to eliminate what are judged to be the most 
important disturbing influences” (Guala, 2005, p. 2). Above it was claimed that the 
opportunity to eliminate certain factors was an advantage. What causal relationships are 
concerned, this is true, but the flipside is that we are excluding factors that do in fact 
influence us in the real world (Schwartz, 2008). This obviously weakens the external validity 
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of an experiment. With respect to this, an experiment is just like any other scientific model; 
in its stylized form it is unable to catch the complexity of the real world.  
Improper monetary incentives  
As previously mentioned, most economic experiments involve real money in order to 
recreate the economic incentives prevalent in the real world. Obviously, the amounts at stake 
in experiments are not as large as in real life. In an experiment studying attitudes toward risk, 
for instance, most participants can afford losing everything. The same would not be true for 
risky situations in real life. Hence, we can suspect that we observe less risk averse behavior 
or more risk seeking behavior in experiments than in real life.  
Another shortcoming of the experiment as a way of understanding what motivates behavior, 
is the fact that experimental studies usually only look at the choices people make, and not the 
reasoning behind the choices. We only observe the actual behavior, while all the processes 
that lead to the behavior remain unknown to the researchers. One way of supplementing 
experiments with regard to this, is to use interview-based studies to gain even more insight. 
A different area of study also aspiring to look beyond the actual behavior or decision making 
of experimental subjects, is neuroeconomics. Neuroeconomics is yet another 
interdisciplinary field of study linking traditional economics and behavioral economics to 
neuroscience (Schiller, 2011). By connecting the experimental subject to an MRI scanner 
and studying these MRI pictures while the subject makes economic choices, one can see 
what parts of the brain are activated during a certain task or decision making process in the 
experiment (Lem, 2012). Still at an early stage, neuroeconomics allows us to use knowledge 
about the brain and cognitive processes in order to take insight about economic decision 
making to a new level. 
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3. Research design 
The empirical section of this thesis is built around an economic experiment. This chapter 
will present the experiment’s context, design and execution.  
3.1 Context 
3.1.1 The Choice Lab 
The experiment that provides the data for this thesis was designed and carried out by 
scholars from The Choice Lab at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). The Choice 
Lab is a team of researchers, mainly from the Department of Economics at NHH. The 
mission of the research group is to “[learn] more about how people make economic and 
moral choices, and how governments, corporations and non-governmental institutions can 
use insights from this research to improve their decision making” (The Choice Lab, 2012). 
The activities of The Choice Lab are mainly funded by the Research Council of Norway, and 
research output has been published in top academic journals like Science, Journal of 
Political Economy and American Economic Review (ibid). The researchers associated with 
this particular experiment are Professor Alexander W. Cappelen, PhD student Sebastian Fest, 
Professor Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Professor Bertil Tungodden. The role of the undersigned in 
the experiment process was to take part in planning the experiment, help recruiting 
participants, and assist in carrying out the experiment.  
3.1.2 The vignettes 
Prior to the lab experiment, two vignette studies were conducted among students at NHH. 
The purpose of the vignettes was to test the planned experimental design in order to discover 
any deficiencies of the question formulations and explanations. To discover possible sources 
of misunderstandings or misinterpretations as easily as possible, the vignettes included a 
comments box where the participants could freely write down any comments on the task 
they had just completed. The comments, along with analyses of the answers given, provided 
a basis for the evaluation of the original design and for further editing of the design. Such 
quality control increases the reliability and internal validity of an experiment. 
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3.1.3 Recruitment 
To increase the external validity by not only experimenting on business students and to 
increase the sample size, students from the University of Bergen (UiB) were invited to 
participate in addition to NHH students. The University of Bergen is a medium-sized 
university with approximately 14 000 students offering study programs within most fields of 
study (UiB, 2012). The main campus is located near the city center of Bergen. Recruitment 
was done by physical recruitment stands at the different faculties a few days prior to the 
experiment. Stands were present at the Faculty of Humanities, the Faculty of Law, the 
faculty of Social Sciences, the Faculty of Psychology and the Faculty of Mathematics and 
Natural Sciences. The reason for this broad approach in the recruitment process was to 
recruit a sample that was as representative for the UiB student population as possible. Stands 
were located in typical mingling areas during lunch hours to reach out to as many students as 
possible. They were briefly informed about the experiment and the fact that they would earn 
a minimum of 100 kr. Stands were manned by research assistants from The Choice Lab. 
Students who wanted to participate signed up to the session that suited them the best either at 
the stand or online. As the experiment was carried out in a building located conveniently on 
campus close to several faculties, the location should not cause a severe selection effect in 
that some students chose to participate or not participate because of the location of the 
experiment. 
A second round of the experiment was carried out at NHH one week after the UiB 
experiment. NHH is a scientific university college offering study programs within economics 
and business administration. NHH is located in one of Bergen’s suburbs and educates 
approximately 3000 students. Students were invited via e-mail and they signed up online to 
the session that suited them the best. Only second year students and master students were 
invited to this experiment because vignettes had been run on first and third year students, and 
including these could bias the results. The experiment took place on the NHH campus, so I 
assume no selection effect from the choice of location.  
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3.1.4 The sample 
Table 3.1 – Summary of sample 
 
Treatment 
% female 
Mean (se) 
Age 
Mean (se) 
CR score 
Mean (se) 
 
N 
1:No choice .44 (.04) 22.83 (.27) 1.58 (.09) 145 
2:Nominal choice .47 (.04) 22.71 (.26) 1.55 (.10) 140 
3:Forced choice .47 (.04) 22.49 (.25) 1.84 (.09) 137 
Total .46 (.02) 22.68 (.15) 1.65 (.05) 422 
 
The total sample consists of 422 participants, whereof 187 are UiB students and 235 are 
NHH students. It was not asked which faculty the UiB students belonged to. The gender 
distribution is 195 women and 227 men. The average age is 22.7 years, and more than 80 per 
cent is between 20 and 25 years old. The true age distribution at NHH and UiB is similar, 
with most students being between 21 and 25 years old (Database for statistikk om høgre 
utdanning, 2012). In terms of age, the sample is thus representative for a student population. 
The average score on the cognitive reflection (CR) test is 1.65 points out of a maximum 
score of 3 points. The distribution among the three treatments no choice (NO), nominal 
choice (NF) and forced choice (FC) is 145, 140 and 137 objects, respectively. 59 per cent of 
the sample are bachelor students, 31 per cent are master students, leaving 10 per cent to other 
study programs, i.e. year programs or PhD programs. In our sample, approximately 70 per 
cent vote for Arbeiderpartiet (the labor party) or Høyre (the conservative party). The political 
opinion of the sample does not seem to differ too much from the general political opinion in 
Norway.  
3.1.5 Setting 
The experiment was carried out at two different locations and dates: October 25
th
 2012 at 
UiB and November 1
st
 2012 at NHH. Both experiments were carried out in computer labs on 
campus and included multiple sessions during the day. Six sessions were carried out at UiB, 
the first one starting 8.15 AM and the last one starting 6.15 PM. Four sessions were carried 
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out at NHH, the first one starting 10.15 AM and the last one starting at 4.15 PM. A PhD 
student and a research coordinator from The Choice Lab led the experiment, helped out by 
research assistants. The participants were asked not to communicate with each other during 
the experiment, and they were prevented from looking at each other’s screens by partitions. 
A session lasted for approximately 1.5 hours, depending on how quick the participants 
answered the questions. The participants were not allowed to leave their seats during a 
session. The experiment was conducted in Norwegian. 
3.1.6 Within-session randomization 
The participants were randomly assigned to a specific seat in a specific room by picking a 
numbered ball from a basket. Their seats determined what treatment they were given. All 
treatments were given in each session. This within-session randomization increases the 
validity of the experiment compared to experiments where each session is given only one 
treatment. This because one can assume that sessions are not perfectly randomized as their 
participants may differ in circadian rhythms and other factors affecting their choice of 
session. For example it might be the case that participants signing up for the 8.15 AM 
session are different on observables and non-observables than the rest of the sample as they 
might be more disciplined and hard working. 
 
3.2 Design 
The participants were given instructions and general information about the experiment from 
moderators who were physically present in the labs. The full instructions and questions are 
reproduced and translated in their entirety in appendix A1. The experiment consisted of four 
segments: First there was a production phase, followed by the lottery and the preliminary 
payment. Then the redistribution phase was carried out, and the experiment concluded with a 
questionnaire. In the following, I will first present the baseline treatment and the rationale 
behind its design. Then I will present the choice treatments, explain the differences between 
these and the baseline, and explain the motivation behind their design.  
The production phase 
As mentioned in chapter 2, this experiment included a production phase where the 
participants were asked to work on a task for 30 minutes. The reason for this is to better 
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mimic real life situations. In society, the goods that are to be distributed are usually a result 
of production, and by working on a task the participants feel that they are entitled to some 
form of compensation for their effort. This opposed to receiving “free” money than can be 
considered a bonus rather than something they feel a right to claim. The task was to build 
four-word sentences from five given words. For example the five words SKY OLD IS 
BLUE THE could form the sentence THE SKY IS BLUE. When a sentence was completed, 
five new words appeared. The participants were asked to work on this task for the full 30 
minutes. They were instructed that they should work on the sentences carefully rather than 
try to finish as many as possible. Further, they were not informed whether or how they 
would be compensated for this effort before they started working, apart from initially being 
informed about the show-up fee of 100 kr and the possibility to earn more. 
The lottery – preliminary payment determination 
When the 30 minutes had passed, the participants were informed about how their payment 
would be decided. This is the phase where different treatments were introduced. The sample 
was randomly divided into three, decided by their seat numbers. The baseline group was 
given the following instructions about how their payment would be decided: 
How much money you make will be determined by a lottery where you with equal 
probability will make 800 kr or 0 kr. In the lottery, a ball will be randomly drawn 
from a ballot with an equal amount of yellow and green balls. If a yellow ball is 
drawn you will make 800 kr, if a green ball is drawn you will make 0 kr. 
The redistribution phase 
Next, the participants were told that they were to redistribute the total amount earned 
between two other participants in the experiment, A and B, whose payments had been 
determined in the same way as for themselves. By now, the participants did not know the 
outcome of their own payment lottery, because this information could bias the redistributive 
decision at hand. The lottery of the other two players had resulted in player A making 800 kr 
and player B making 0 kr. They were informed that how they allocated the money would not 
affect their own payment, but that their decision could possibly determine the payments of 
the two other participants. Since all participants were to redistribute between two other 
participants, only some of the decisions could be implemented. The role of this third party 
spectator is thus that he was indeed a participant in the experiment, but not in this particular 
redistribution situation where he was a dictator. Had he been one of the players, self-interest 
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would probably color his decision to a considerable extent. Another option would have been 
to let the spectators be pure spectators, and not themselves work and participate in the 
lotteries. The reason why the spectators are players in other games is to increase 
observations by letting each participant have two roles in the experiment. Whether we would 
have seen different results if the spectators were pure spectators, remain speculations in this 
thesis. On one hand, a pure spectator is more neutral and unbiased. On the other hand, a 
participating spectator will most likely more easily identify with the situation and recognize 
the details in the game.  
After the participants had decided how much they wanted to transfer from the player with 
800 kr to the player with 0 kr, they were asked to write down their motivation behind their 
redistribution decision. This was done to gain a deeper understanding of what motivated the 
decisions.  
The Questionnaire 
Finally, the participants answered questions on age, gender, political views and whether they 
were bachelor students, master students or other. They also answered questions about to 
what degree they perceived that luck, hard work and talent determine personal income, and 
also to what degree they thought it is fair that luck, hard work and talent determine personal 
income. They also reported to what extent they thought we should do more or less to even 
out income differences in Norway. Finally, they answered three assignments in the form of 
numerical “brain teasers” in order to identify the respondents’ cognitive reflection. This was 
included to analyze whether there is a relationship between redistributive decisions and 
cognitive reflection. This is discussed further in chapter 4.  
At the end of the experiment, the participants got to know their final payments and got the 
money in cash in sealed envelopes with payment codes on. The research assistants who put 
the money in the envelopes were not the same ones who handed them out. This to maintain 
anonymity in that no one besides the participant himself could know the size of a 
participant’s payment.  
This baseline treatment was designed for the purpose of provoking the wish for an even 
distribution. The notion of real work effort that was the same for all participants and the 
lottery being presented as a payment for this effort was supposed to trigger a substantial 
transfer from the lucky winner to the unlucky loser. The reason for preferring a fairly even 
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distribution in the baseline is that it serves an appropriate comparative basis for the other 
treatments where the hypothesis was a less even distribution. The only part of the experiment 
where the design differed from the baseline was the lottery phase. The first choice treatment 
was one where we changed the lottery by introducing a completely meaningless choice. 
Although determining the outcome, the two alternatives were identical to the players for all 
control purposes. Our hypothesis was that the element of choice would trigger the illusion of 
control and combined with a choice egalitarian fairness view result in smaller transfers from 
the lucky winner to the unlucky loser. 
[Nominal Choice (NC)] 
We first ask you to make a choice between two colors, yellow and green. Your choice 
will determine the outcome of a lottery that decides how much money you will make, 
where you with equal probability can make 800 kr or 0 kr. In the lottery, a ball will be 
randomly drawn from a ballot with an equal amount of yellow and green balls. If you 
have chosen the same color as the ball that is drawn you will make 800 kr, if you have 
chosen the color of the ball that is not drawn you will make 0 kr. 
We now ask you to make a choice by clicking on one of the two pictures below. 
If you have chosen the same color as the ball that is drawn you will make 800 kr, if 
you have chosen the color of the ball that is not drawn you will make 0 kr. 
Remember that the ballot contains an equal amount of yellow and green balls. 
 
Concerning the second choice treatment rendered below, the players were theoretically able 
to control the outcome. However, the alternative to the risky option was highly unattractive, 
and for all purposes “forcing” the players to expose themselves to risk. Similar to the 
nominal choice treatment, the hypothesis for this treatment was that the element of choice 
would result in smaller transfers from the lucky winner to the unlucky loser than in the 
baseline. 
[Forced Choice (FC)] 
You can choose between two different payments. You can either choose to make 25 kr 
or you can let the payment be decided by a lottery where you with equal probability 
can make 800 kr or 0 kr. In the lottery, a ball will be randomly drawn from a ballot 
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with an equal amount of yellow and green balls. If a yellow ball is drawn you will 
make 800 kr, if a green ball is drawn you will make 0 kr. 
We now ask you to make a choice by clicking on one of the two pictures below. 
If you choose the picture of the coins, you will make 25 kr, if you choose the picture of 
the lottery your payment will be decided by a lottery where you with equal 
probabilities can make 800 kr or 0 kr. 
As we see from the design of the three different treatments, the No Choice (NO) outcome is 
based on pure luck. The players have no opportunity to avoid the risk the lottery imposes,  
neither do they have any opportunity to control the outcome of the lottery. In the Nominal 
Choice (NC) option, the outcome depends on the choice made by the participant. However, 
this is a meaningless or “empty” choice – a choice illusion. The chance of winning is still 50 
per cent, and no information, skills or action can improve the participants’ position. In the 
Forced Choice (FC) option, the participant actually has the opportunity to avoid risk, but at a 
very high cost. In order to eliminate risk, the participant has to give up 375 kr of the 
expected value of the lottery of 400 kr (800*0.5 + 0*0.5 = 400) by settling for a safe 
payment of 25 kr. According to expected utility theory and risk theory, assumed known in 
this thesis, one has to be very risk averse to pay a risk premium of 375 kr to avoid risk in a 
game where the expected value is 400 kr. As the safe option decreases in value from the 
expected value, the safe alternative’s attractiveness decreases. As 25 kr is considered a small 
amount of money for any student in Norway in 2012, at least compared to the potential gain 
of 800 kr, this option is for most people very unattractive. The FC treatment is thus partly a 
choice illusion in the way that the unattractive alternative somewhat “forces” the participant 
to choose the risk of the pure luck lottery, although not as extreme as the NC treatment.  
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4. Findings and analysis 
This chapter will present the main findings and analysis of the experiment. I will discuss the 
results in the light of theory presented in chapter 2, and topics for further research will be 
proposed.  
4.1 Distribution of transfers 
Figure 4.1 – Redistributive transfers by treatment 
 
Table 4.1 – Distribution of transfers by treatment, fractions 
Transfer in kr NO NC FC Total 
0 10.34 19.29 18.25 15.88 
10-350  26.9 33.58 32.12 30.80 
400 62.76 42.14 47.45 50.95 
500-800 0.00 4.99 2.18 2.37 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Figure 4.1 and table 4.1 show the distribution of the transfers the spectators made, measured 
in kr, for the different treatments. We see that most people, 51 per cent, prefer an equal 
distribution where both player A and player B receive 400 kr, but that this fraction is lower 
for the NC and FC treatments compared to the baseline. About 16 per cent think that the 
outcome of the lottery should be the final distribution and do not transfer anything at all to 
player B. In between, we see some who let player A enjoy being lucky to a certain extent, 
but still gives a share to player B. Also, we see a few outliers who for some reason 
transferred more than 400 kr to the unlucky loser B. These five participants only represent 
about 1 per cent of the total sample, and I consider them exceptions that confirm the concept 
of forced choice rather than an interesting phenomenon. As there seems to be no obvious 
patterns concerning observable characteristics for these five participants, I choose not to 
pursue this further. 
 
4.2 The choice illusion 
So how is the ex post inequality different among the pure luck baseline treatment, and the 
NC and FC treatments? A simple measure of inequality appropriate for this experiment and 
this thesis is the following: 
 
            
                                   
             
        
 
This definition says that inequality equals 1 if any of the two persons in a pair of two earns 
all the money and the other earns nothing. Measuring the absolute values allows for the 
person earning most of the money being either person A or person B. If person A and person 
B earn the same, inequality equals 0. Below you see a figure showing the inequality after the 
spectator has redistributed the total earnings. Keep in mind that the a priori inequality is 1 
for all treatments as one player won all the money in the lotteries. 
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Figure 4.2 – Average inequality  
 
Table 4.2 – Average inequality  
 
Treatment 
AB 
Mean (se) 
Inequality 
Mean (se) 
P-value, Wilcoxon rank sum test 
H0: Inequality(NO) = 
Inequality(treatment) 
1:No choice 
318.2 
(11.16) 
.2044 
 (.03) 
 
2:Nominal 
choice 
287.5 
(15.90) 
.3688 
 (.03) 
0.0001 
3:Forced 
choice 
283.3 
(14.39) 
.3246 
 (.03) 
0.0045 
Total 
296.7 
(8.04) 
.2980 
 (.02) 
 
 
Figure 4.2 and table 4.2 present the main findings of this thesis. The figure shows the 
average inequality after redistribution for each treatment. The table shows this numerically, 
with both the inequality measures and the average transfer in kr from the lucky winner A to 
the unlucky loser B. For inference, I have used the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
(Mann-Whitney test), see appendix A2. The null hypothesis is that the inequality is the same 
for the baseline and the given treatment. This table reports the p-values of the test. As we 
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see, H0 is rejected at the 1 % level for both treatments as the p-values are < 0.01. Thus we 
conclude that the inequality is significantly larger after redistribution for NC and FC 
compared to the baseline. This result suggests that the participants suffer from a choice 
illusion – they do in fact prefer a less equal distribution when a choice is introduced, even if 
this choice is completely or almost completely meaningless. Accepting more inequality 
when outcomes depend on individual choices is in accordance with the liberal egalitarian 
and choice egalitarian fairness ideal. Here we see that the NC and FC treatments are to a 
significant extent considered scenarios involving choice and people are being held 
responsible for these choices. In the NC case, the participants in this experiment hold each 
other responsible for choices even though the choice does not give the participants any more 
control over the situation and the outcome than the baseline. Hence, it seems like they do not 
to recognize how “empty” this choice is. This is in accordance with the concept of illusion of 
control. Similarly, they also hold each other responsible for agreeing to expose themselves to 
risk in the FC case to a significant extent, regardless of the obvious unattractiveness of the 
safe alternative. This is in accordance with the findings from Cappelen, et al. (2011) where 
the willingness to redistribute did not depend on the value of the safe option.  
Taken into account that the initial inequality was 1 for all treatments, we also see a 
considerable reduction in inequality across all treatments. This is evidence of somewhat 
egalitarian preferences; less inequality is preferred over more inequality regardless the rules 
of the game. For the NO baseline treatment, inequality is reduces by approximately 80 per 
cent, from 1 to 0.2. For the NC treatment, this reduction is 63 per cent, and the FC inequality 
is reduced by 68 per cent. This means that the inequality is 85 per cent larger in NC than in 
NO, and 60 per cent larger in FC than in NO.  
In the pure luck case (NO), where the choice component is absent, we see that on average 
318.2 kr are transferred from the lucky player A to the unlucky player B. A transfer of 400 kr 
would prove a strict egalitarian fairness ideal, while a transfer of 0 kr illustrates a libertarian 
view. For the NC and FC treatments, the element of choice is present and makes a significant 
difference according to the conclusion above. On average, participants in the NC group 
transfer 287.5 kr and participants in the FC group transfer 283.3 kr. Assuming an illusion of 
control in that the participants do in fact look at the choices in FC and NC as real choices, a 
lower average transfer to the loser and higher inequality is evidence of choice egalitarianism. 
It could also have been a result of an increased fraction of libertarians, but as we assume 
randomization we know that the only factor that can explain the differences between NO and 
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NC/FC is the element of choice. According to the properties of the experiment which allow 
us to establish causal relationships, we can conclude that the larger inequalities in NC and 
FC are due to the introduction of a choice.  
From section 2.4 we know that the choice egalitarian’s decision depend on whether the two 
players A and B made the same choice or not. In FC, the spectator was informed that both A 
and B had chosen the lottery, and so one would expect a fairly equal distribution for this 
treatment. This is not what we observe. In this scenario, the distributer considers two aspects 
of the lottery. On one hand, the players have made the same choices, and deserve equal 
payment according to the choice egalitarian view. On the other hand, both players have 
chosen the exposure to risk, and most prefer holding others responsible for this voluntary 
risk exposure, resulting in less redistribution. Some decision makers may have perceived this 
scenario as a dilemma. The fact that the safe alternative is highly unattractive is discussed 
above.   
In the nominal choice situation, the distributing spectator is informed that the two players 
made different choices resulting in A winning and B losing. According to choice 
egalitarianism, the spectator should then redistribute less than in the baseline. This is in fact 
the case in this experiment, and this mechanism might also explain why the inequality is 
slightly larger for NC than FC, although not significantly. Initially, we would perhaps 
assume less inequality in NC than in FC as the choice in NC adds no control whatsoever 
while the choice in FC theoretically gives the player some control over the situation. 
Observing marginally greater inequality for NC than FC (0.36 vs. 0.32, not significant) can 
thus be explained by the fact that the players did not make the same choice in NC and hence 
that the spectators believe that inequality due to different choices is more acceptable than 
inequality due to the same choices. 
 
4.3 Motivation behind transfer decisions 
After the transfer decision, the participants were asked to write down what motivated their 
decision. This was done to gain better insight in people’s attitudes and a deeper 
understanding of what determines what we consider fair and how we treat the notion of 
choice. There are a few recurring explanations. The table below gives an overview of the 
most common explanations of transfer decisions. The comments are freely translated. 
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Table 4.3 – Motivation behind transfer decisions 
Transfer Treatment Comment 
0 kr 
All 
“Redistribution is changing the rules of the game after the game 
has been played.” 
“The winner wins and the loser loses. That is what a lottery is all 
about. Life is unfair”  
 “I would have distributed differently if the amounts were larger.” 
NO “One is allowed to be lucky.” 
NC “Player A chose the right color and should be rewarded for that.” 
FC 
“Both chose to enter the lottery and were aware of the possible 
outcomes and then they have to deal with ending up with 0 kr.” 
0 kr <, 
 < 400 kr 
All 
“Player A should enjoy being lucky to some extent, but I do not 
think it is fair that player B goes home empty-handed.” 
NO 
“Player A should enjoy being lucky to some extent, but I do not 
think it is fair that player B goes home empty-handed.”  
NC 
“Do not want to split 50/50 because A should be allowed to enjoy 
choosing the right color.” 
“The lottery is pure luck, and you have not deserved the money just 
because you chose the right ball. Thus, one person should not get 
all the money. But despite the luck, you should get a small reward 
for choosing the right color, as both players had the same starting 
point before the choice.” 
FC 
“Choosing the lottery, they agree to gamble their earnings. Still it 
is unfair that B does not get anything, because both have made the 
same effort. The winner should have more money, but the loser 
should also get something.” 
400 kr 
All 
 “Equal pay for equal work”  
“This is what I would have wanted others to do for me if I were the 
loser.”  
“Both will be quite happy instead of one being very happy and one 
being unhappy.” 
NO 
“As the effort is equal for the two, it is not fair that payment is 
determined by lottery.” 
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NC 
 “The color of the drawn ball was completely random and so an 
equal split is fair.” 
FC 
 “The players made the same choices and no differences between 
the persons are presented. Therefore they should get the same 
payment.” 
 
Although the numbers prove the presence of a choice illusion, many treat the NC lottery as a 
pure luck lottery and use the same arguments as the ones receiving the NO treatment. Also, 
some explicitly recognize the meaninglessness of the choice, like the second last comment in 
table 4.3. This reasoning results in the massive reduction in inequality across all treatments. 
The opposite also occurs, illustrated by comments saying that player A should keep all the 
money as he chose the right color. Reasoning like this is what causes the choice illusion 
effect. Consciously or unconsciously, this has affected the spectators and resulted in 
significantly higher inequality for the NC group. Note also that some express that they would 
have behaved differently if the amounts were larger. This weakens the generalizability of the 
experiment as real world income distribution scenarios usually involve amounts that are 
substantially larger than 800 kr. 
Perhaps interestingly, none of the participants explicitly recognize the unattractiveness of the 
safe option in FC. Overall, the objects in this treatment either argue that the players have to 
take the consequences of exposing themselves to risk, or they seem to ignore the safe option 
altogether and argue as if lottery were the only option. No one explicitly mentions the fact 
that the low value of the safe option affects the decision of choosing the lottery. This 
corresponds to the findings of Cappelen, et al. (2011) where the distributers do not 
distinguish between different values of the safe option when redistributing gains between 
lucky and unlucky risk-takers. A common statement from participants choosing to let player 
A keep all the money is that the choice of risk exposure is one’s own full responsibility, 
without commenting on the value of the safe option relative to the expected value of the 
lottery. This finding can serve as an argument when suggesting that we ascribe choices too 
much responsibility as we do not fully recognize the details and nuances in scenarios 
involving elements of risk, choice and luck. 
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4.4 What affects inequality acceptance? 
Table 4.4 – Regression: What affects inequality?  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ineq Ineq Ineq Ineq Ineq 
Choice 0.142*** 0.102** 0.195*** 0.213*** 0.215*** 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.063) (0.080) (0.080) 
      
High CR  -0.099 -0.109 -0.109 -0.107 
  (0.072) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
      
High CR*Choice  0.143* 0.114 0.116 0.114 
  (0.087) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
      
Female   -0.024 -0.021 -0.017 
   (0.067) (0.068) (0.069) 
      
Female*Choice   -0.174** -0.180** -0.182** 
   (0.081) (0.083) (0.083) 
      
NHH    0.016 0.014 
    (0.064) (0.064) 
      
NHH*Choice    -0.029 -0.026 
    (0.079) (0.079) 
      
Age     0.005 
     (0.006) 
      
Constant 0.204*** 0.230*** 0.244*** 0.234*** 0.123 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.052) (0.065) (0.151) 
N 422 422 422 422 422 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: Choice is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the participant is in the NC or FC group. High CR is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 of the respondent answered all the cognitive reflection questions correctly. 
Female and NHH are dummies for being female or attending NHH, respectively. Column (1) reports the effect 
of a choice treatment on inequality. (2) includes the treatment effect of a high CR score, (3) adds the gender 
treatment effect, and (4) further check for different treatment effects on NHH and UiB students. Column (5) 
controls for age. We see a clear gender treatment effect. The initial overall treatment effect is 21.5 percentage 
points higher inequality. 
 
Table 4.4 allows for a closer look at the results. It reports how CR score, gender, school and 
age affect the inequality and whether possible effects are treatment effects or general 
differences. First of all, it is clear that the effect of introducing a choice is driven by the male 
part of the sample. There is in fact no significant treatment effect among females, only 
among men. While the overall initial treatment effect of having faced the choice lotteries of 
NC or FC is a 21.5 percentage point increase in inequality, this increase is 18.2 + 1.7 = 19.9 
percentage points lower, and insignificant, if you are female. This is an interesting and 
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perhaps somewhat surprising finding. Explanations are at this point only speculative. As 
there is no difference in inequality in the baseline group, it cannot be explained by an overall 
more egalitarian fairness ideal among women. The results show that men hold others 
responsible for the choices made in NC and FC to a greater extent than women do. This 
indicates that women are more sensitive to the nuances in the scenarios and recognize the 
meaninglessness of the choice in NC and the unattractiveness of the safe option in FC more 
than men. What could be done in new studies to gain more understanding of these gender 
differences is discussed in the section on ideas for further research in the latter part of this 
chapter.  
Further, there are no differences across age, school (NHH or UiB), or cognitive reflection 
test scores. The absence of an age effect is not surprising considering the fairly narrow age 
span resulting from this being a student sample. One could suspect a difference between 
business students at NHH and university students at UiB, but we see no such school effect. 
This concurrence across student groups strengthens the validity. The idea of including the 
cognitive reflection test comes from Frederick (2005) who examines how ability or 
intelligence, measured by various cognitive ability tests like the one included in this study, 
relate to decision making. People with high cognitive abilities differ from people with lower 
cognitive abilities in various ways (Frederick, 2005), but the question in mind for this 
experiment was whether we would see any differences in transfers; whether “smart” people 
redistribute differently than “stupid” people. First off all, we see no such intelligence effect. 
Second, one can question whether this simple, three-question test is able to reflect the overall 
cognitive ability of a person. Considering the scope of this thesis and absence of a significant 
effect, the topic will not be pursued further.  
 
4.5 Beliefs about income determination  
The questionnaire part of the experiment included questions about to what extent the 
participants perceived that luck, hard work and talent play an important role in determining 
personal income, to what extent the participants thought it was fair that luck, hard work and 
talent play an important role in determining personal income, and whether the participants 
thought we should do more or less to even out income differences in Norway (see appendix 
A1). As these questions were asked after the lottery and redistribution phase of the 
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experiment, the answers might be biased as a result of the preceding experience. 
Consequently, I will not put too much weight on how these beliefs relate to transfers and 
inequality, but a brief presentation is still appropriate.  
Table 4.5 – Beliefs about income determination 
Variable Mean Standard error 
Luck 6.03 .12 
Effort 2.73 .10 
Talent 3.33 .09 
Luck_fair 7.83 .11 
Effort_fair 1.64 .07 
Talent_fair 3.34 .11 
Do_more 4.85 .11 
 
Table 4.5 reports the mean beliefs about income determination across all treatments. Each 
answer is given as a number on a scale from 1 to 10, see appendix A1. The variable Luck 
takes values between 1 and 10 where 1 is that the respondent believes that luck plays an 
important role in determining personal income, while 10 is that luck does not play an 
important role. The same logic applies to the variables Effort and Talent. The variable 
Luck_fair takes values between 1 and 10 where 1 is that the respondent believes that it is fair 
that luck plays an important role in determining personal income, while 10 is that it is not 
fair that luck plays an important role. The same logic applies to the variables Effort_fair and 
Talent_fair.  The variable Do_more takes values between 1 and 10 where 1 is that we should 
do more to even out income differences in Norway and 10 is that we should do less. 
Expectedly, on average people think that hard work and talent play a more important part in 
determining personal income than luck do, and they also believe that it is more fair that hard 
work and effort affect income. 
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Table 4.6 – Regression: Beliefs about income determination 
 (1) 
 Inequality 
  
Luck -0.002 
 (0.008) 
  
Effort 0.009 
 (0.012) 
  
Talent -0.011 
 (0.012) 
  
Luck_fair -0.029*** 
 (0.009) 
  
Effort_fair -0.026* 
 (0.015) 
  
Talent_fair -0.017* 
 (0.009) 
  
Do_more 0.034*** 
 (0.008) 
  
Constant 0.361** 
 (0.164) 
N 422 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: Column (1) reports the effect of the different variable on the ex post inequality. Additional controls that 
are left out of the table are treatment, age, gender and CR score. The variable Luck takes values between 1 and 
10 where 1 is that the respondent believes that luck plays an important role in determining personal income, 
while 10 is that luck does not play an important role. The same logic applies to the variables Effort and Talent. 
The variable Luck_fair takes values between 1 and 10 where 1 is that the respondent believes that it is fair that 
luck plays an important role in determining personal income, while 10 is that it is not fair that luck plays an 
important role. The same logic applies to the variables Effort_fair and Talent_fair. Consequently, a negative 
coefficient means that the more a respondent think it is unfair that luck determines income, the less inequality 
his redistributive decision results in. The variable Do_more takes values between 1 and 10 where 1 is that we 
should do more to even out income differences in Norway and 10 is that we should do less. This model says 
that the less you think it is unfair that luck determines income and the less you think we should do to even out 
income differences, the higher inequality you accept in the redistribution phase.  
 
Table 4.6 reveals some expected findings. Controlling for treatment, age, gender and CR 
score, we see that the more you find it unfair that luck determines income, the more equally 
you distribute the 800 kr in the distribution phase. Also, the more you think we should do to 
even out income differences in Norway, the more equally you distribute the money at hand. 
The rest of the belief variables have very small effects and are insignificant at a 5 per cent 
level. Keep in mind that these findings might suffer from a bias. Still, the significant 
correlations represent an intuitive relationship between attitude and behavior, and one can 
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suggest that this is a likely true relationship. 
 
4.6 Shortcomings 
As mentioned in section 2.5.2, the economic experiment has its shortcoming and limitations. 
As a precautionary note to those wishing to study the findings further, a short evaluation of 
this experiment is appropriate.  
First, whether there is a Hawthorne effect present in this study is hard to detect. By letting 
the participants know that they are a part of an experiment, one always risks getting a 
Hawthorne effect weakening the validity of the results. As this experiment involves real 
money, one can argue that real incentives provokes genuine behavior, but as the amounts at 
stake are relatively small, one cannot reject the claim that results might be biased by the 
Hawthorne effect to a certain extent. Second, the sample is certainly not representative for a 
greater population. According to section 3.1.4, there is reason to assume that it is fairly 
representative for a Norwegian student population, but students differ from the general 
public in various ways. Ergo, the results cannot necessarily be applied to other populations. 
Third, this experiment is like any other experiment in that it does not mimic a real world 
situation and its complexity. This experiment is stylized and only able to look at isolated 
effects. Fourth, the amounts at stake are perhaps too small to trigger real world economic 
behavior. Some even mention in the comments that they would have acted differently if the 
amounts were bigger. Even though the amounts involved obviously are smaller than many 
real world economic scenarios, 400 kr or 800 kr is not without value for a Norwegian student 
in 2012, and so the money does indeed serve as true incentives, although somewhat weak. 
 
4.7 Ideas for further research  
The experiment used in this thesis has limited generalizability because of the sample 
characteristics and sample size. To increase the external validity of this experiment, bigger 
and more representative samples are desirable. If the results coincide across different 
samples, the external validity is increased. If not, it could be interesting to study why some 
groups suffer from the choice illusion while others do not. Comparing results across socio-
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economic groups and across national borders are two examples. For example, an interesting 
study would be one where the experiment is carried out in different individualistic Western 
societies like Western Europe and the United States and then compare the results to those of 
typical East Asian societies that are in general more collectivistic. Hofstede (1980) identifies 
international cultural differences in a work-related environment, and find that Western 
societies like the American, German, French and British are in general more individualistic 
than traditional, collectivistic East Asian societies like the South-Korean, Japanese and 
Chinese. With this as a backdrop, it could be interesting to see whether these cultural 
differences affect how much responsibility one ascribes to individual choices and how much 
one is willing to redistribute.  
By expanding the sample one might also find effects of age. In particular, it could be 
interesting to study how children would redistribute compared to young adults, older adults 
and elders. Almås, et al. (2010) study how fairness considerations change with age in a 
variant of a dictator game where self-interest influences the decision. The paper also 
mentions other literature stating that children move away from a strict egalitarian fairness 
view towards more recognition of individual contributions and other circumstances as they 
grow older (Almås, et al., 2010). Applying a pure moral motivation experiment like the one 
used for this thesis to a sample of children would contribute to the literature on how fairness 
considerations change through life, and whether the illusion of control also applies to 
children. 
Revealing a clear gender effect, it is desirable to look deeper into why the choice illusion is 
primarily a male effect. New experimental designs could include other choice situations 
where the choices are more or less real and see how the gender differences evolve according 
to how controllable the choice scenarios are for the players. This could reveal whether 
females in general assign less responsibility to choice, or whether they are just better at 
discovering meaningless choices.   
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the role of the spectator can be examined more thoroughly. By 
letting some spectators be pure spectators who do not participate in the working task or in 
the lottery, while others are participating spectators like in this experiment, one can study 
how the spectator’s position affects his decisions.  
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5. Conclusion 
Many assume that increased freedom of choice means better options and increased 
satisfaction and happiness. On the other hand, more choices mean more responsibility for 
outcomes in life. This responsibility seems fairly reasonable if the choice scenarios in life 
have real options and more than one sound alternative, and the ability to choose increases 
our control over the situation and its outcome. The starting point for this thesis was the 
statement that there exists a range of choice situations in life that are mere illusions – 
situations involving choice where the decision maker have little or no control over the 
outcome despite the freedom to choose. Further, we know that people have a psychological 
tendency to exaggerate the meaning of choices by believing that the choices gives us more 
control than they really do. The main question of this thesis was to what extent people suffer 
from a choice illusion in moral economic decision making by holding others responsible for 
such meaningless choices.  
The experiment analyzed has aspired to reveal how third party dictators change their 
redistribution between lucky and unlucky risk-takers when an element of choice is 
introduced in a lottery. These choices were complete or almost complete illusions – it was 
either very costly to avoid the risk of a pure luck lottery, or it was impossible to control the 
outcome despite the freedom of choice. Using a pure luck lottery as a baseline, we find that 
people transfer less from the lucky to the unlucky when such an “empty” choice is 
introduced. Using a simple measure of inequality that takes values between 0 and 1 where 0 
is perfect equality and 1 means that one player gets all the earnings, we find that inequality is 
reduced substantially across all treatments, but that people redistribute less in the choice 
treatments. Findings from this experiment suggest that we might put too much weight on 
choices and thus hold each other responsible for choices to a too large extent. With increased 
freedom of choice in economic matters, this causes increased economic inequality relative to 
pooled risk systems. Hence, there seems to be a discord between the liberal egalitarian 
attitude welcoming increased freedom of choice and individual responsibility for these 
choices, and the egalitarian opinion that inequality is a negative trait of a society. 
Insight obtained through this study about moral motivation in distribution issues and how we 
interpret the role of choices can be applied to many aspects of society. Whether governments 
should make centralized choices on behalf of their citizens or let the citizens have substantial 
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freedom of choice including the responsibility for these choices is a recurring topic on the 
political agenda in Norway as well as in other countries. Many agree that too much 
inequality is undesirable, but still we do not accept to suffer from other people’s poor 
judgment and choices.  
As mentioned initially, the freedom to choose your own pension fund scheme in Norway or 
the freedom to choose your own physician serve as examples of such choice scenarios that 
for many are practically shots in the dark. Of course, some will be able to make qualified 
choices, but to the man in street many of the alternatives in such choices emerge as almost 
identical, resulting in more or less random decisions that he is later often held responsible 
for. An argument in favor of holding people responsible for such decisions is that any person 
can sit down and familiarize themselves with the different pension fund schemes or different 
physicians and in that way be able to make a qualified decision. This is of course a 
theoretical option, but for many the cost of doing this job is very high. This applies to many 
real life situations involving choices; the objective possibility to control an outcome is there, 
but the realistic possibility to actually use this to our advantage is small, if not practically 
absent. A debate that can arise from this is whether we want a society with substantial 
freedom of choice, but risking more inequality, or whether we are willing to sacrifice some 
freedom of choice for the benefit of less economic inequality.  
This thesis has presented an analyzed an interesting trait in moral economic decision making 
and how we interpret the element of choice. Despite imperfect external validity, it reveals 
some tendencies that can be studied further in order to establish stronger evidence of this 
choice illusion in distributive justice. According to experimental economist Bart Wilson, 
fairness is not so much about equity as about the rules of the game (Wilson, 2010). The 
illusion of control combined with a choice egalitarian fairness ideal seems to result in people 
being “blinded by the choice”. Acknowledging the general illusion of control and the choice 
illusion in moral economic decision making allows for a more deliberate starting point when 
discussing what should be the rules of the various “games” in society. 
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Appendix 
A1 – Instructions for the laboratory experiment 
The following is translated from Norwegian. The sign  means new screenshot. Writing in 
brackets refers to procedures not explained explicitly to the participants. Normal writing 
refers to spoken instructions from the moderator. Writing in italics refers to instructions 
given on the computer screens.  
Before the session starts 
[Moderator informs the leader about the number of participants present when all participants 
are seated. The leader starts when the status page shows that all participants are registered.] 
General introduction 
Welcome to this experiment. My name is ........ and will lead the experiment.  
In this experiment you can, depending on the choices you and others make, earn money. The 
money will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.  
The results from this experiment will be used in a research project and it is therefore 
important that everybody comply with the rules of conduct that are handed out: 
 You cannot communicate with the other participants. 
 If you have questions or problems during the experiment, raise a hand and one of the 
research assistants will come and help you.  
 You cannot open other web pages. 
 If you break these rules you will have to leave the room. There will be breaks during 
the course of the experiment. It is important that you remain quiet and calm during 
these breaks.  
You will be completely anonymous during the experiment. At no time will your identity be 
requested. Neither is it possible for us, the other participants or anyone else, to find out what 
choices you have made.  
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When the experiment is over, a payment code will appear on your screen and we ask you to 
write down the code on the piece of paper lying next to you. When you leave the room after 
the experiment, you will provide your code and you will be given an envelope containing the 
money you have made. The envelopes will be prepared by persons who will not be present in 
the room when the envelopes are handed out. We do this to prevent that anyone knows how 
much each of you earn.  
The experiment consists of three parts and instructions will appear on the screen prior to 
each part of the experiment. You will soon get information about the first part of the 
experiment on your screens. Please read through the instructions carefully and click on the 
button below the instructions to confirm that you have read them.  
[Leader opens for instructions to part 1.] 
Part 1 – Working task 
In the first part of this experiment you will work on a language assignment. Five English 
words will be presented to you and you will be asked to make sentences or expressions using 
four of these words. The sentences MUST CONTAIN FOUR WORDS. For example, if the 
words are "sky, blue, is, the, old", you can make the sentence "the sky is blue". 
We ask you to work on this task for 30 minutes. When you have completed a sentence or 
expression, you will get five new words. The aim is not to finish as many sentences as 
possible, but to work carefully with each set of words. Please work continuously with the 
task until the time is up. 
 
Everybody has now read the instructions to the first part of the experiment. This task will 
take half an hour and you will soon be asked to begin. When the assignment is over, there 
might be some waiting time, and in that case we ask you to wait and remain calm until 
further instructions are given. 
[Production phase 30 minutes.] 
You have now completed the first part of the experiment.  
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Part 2 – Lottery & preliminary payment determination 
You will now get information about the second part of the experiment on your screen. Please 
read through the instructions carefully and click on the button below the instructions to 
confirm that you have read them. When everybody has read the instructions, the second part 
of the experiment will appear on the screen. When the assignment is over, there might be 
some waiting time, and in that case we ask you to wait and remain calm until all the 
participants are finished. 
[Leader opens for lottery.] 
You have now worked on the language assignment for 30 minutes. You will get paid for this 
work and we will now explain how your payment will be determined. In the next part of the 
experiment there will be a distribution phase, you will get more information on that later.  
 
[Each participant sees only one of the following three treatments:] 
(1) 
How much money you make will be determined by a lottery where you with equal probability 
will make 800 kr or 0 kr. In the lottery, a ball will be randomly drawn from a ballot with an 
equal amount of yellow and green balls. If a yellow ball is drawn you will make 800 kr, if a 
green ball is drawn you will make 0 kr. 
 
(2) 
We first ask you to make a choice between two colors, yellow and green. Your choice will 
determine the outcome of a lottery that decides how much money you will make, where you 
with equal probability can make 800 kr or 0 kr. In the lottery, a ball will be randomly drawn 
from a ballot with an equal amount of yellow and green balls. If you have chosen the same 
color as the ball that is drawn you will make 800 kr, if you have chosen the color of the ball 
that is not drawn you will make 0 kr. 
 
We now ask you to make a choice by clicking on one of the two pictures below. 
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If you have chosen the same color as the ball that is drawn you will make 800 kr, if you have 
chosen the color of the ball that is not drawn you will make 0 kr. 
Remember that the ballot contains an equal amount of yellow and green balls. 
 
(3) 
You can choose between two different payments. You can either choose to make 25 kr or you 
can let the payment be decided by a lottery where you with equal probability can make 800 
kr or 0 kr. In the lottery, a ball will be randomly drawn from a ballot with an equal amount 
of yellow and green balls. If a yellow ball is drawn you will make 800 kr, if a green ball is 
drawn you will make 0 kr. 
 
We now ask you to make a choice by clicking on one of the two pictures below. 
If you choose the picture of the coins, you will make 25 kr, if you choose the picture of the 
lottery your payment will be decided by a lottery where you with equal probabilities can 
make 800 kr or 0 kr. 
 
 
Part 3 – The redistribution phase 
We have now reached the distribution phase of the experiment. On the next screenshot you 
will be asked to decide the distribution of the money that two other participants in this 
experiment have earned. Your choice will with a certain probability decide how much these 
two participants will be paid in this experiment. Your choice will not affect your own 
payment in this experiment. 
 
You will decide the distribution for two other participants in the experiment, who we refer to 
as person A and person B. Both have worked for 30 minutes, and the payment was 
determined the same way as for you.  
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[The participants of all treatments are informed that person A had made 800 kr and person B 
had made 0 kr.] 
In the box below you will write how much of the 800 kr you will transfer from person A to 
person B. Remember that your choice may determine how much person A and person B will 
get paid in this experiment. 
 
 
Explain what motivated your distributive choice. 
 
Everyone has now completed this part of the experiment. 
Part 4 – Questions 
We now ask you to answer some questions which soon will appear on your screen. The 
questions will not affect your payment. When you have answered the questions, you click on 
the continue button. When you have completed the questions, there might be some waiting 
time, and in that case we ask you to wait and remain calm until all the participants are 
finished. 
We now ask you to specify to which degree you believe the following factors play an 
important part in determining the size of a person’s income. 
"1" means that you completely agree with the statement to the left, "10" means that you 
completely agree with the statement to the right. The numbers in between specify to what 
degree you agree or disagree with the each of the statements respectively. 
Please answer all the questions below. Mark the number on the scale that you think reflects 
your view the best. 
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1: Luck plays 
an important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10: Luck does 
not play an 
important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income. 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
1: Hard work 
plays an 
important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10: Hard work 
does not play 
an important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income. 
           
 
 
 
 
1: Talent plays 
an important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10: Talent 
does not play 
an important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income. 
           
 
 
 
We now ask you to specify to which degree you believe the following factors play an 
important part in determining the size of a person’s income. 
"1" means that you completely agree with the statement to the left, "10" means that you 
completely agree with the statement to the right. The numbers in between specify to what 
degree you agree or disagree with the each of the statements respectively. 
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Please answer all the questions below. Mark the number on the scale that you think reflects 
your view the best. 
 
1: It is fair 
that luck plays 
an important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10: It is not 
fair that luck 
plays an 
important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income. 
           
 
 
 
 
 
1: It is fair 
that hard 
work plays an 
important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income.. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10: It is not 
fair that hard 
work plays an 
important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income. 
           
 
 
 
 
1: It is fair 
that talent 
plays an 
important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10: It is not 
fair that talent 
plays an 
important 
part in 
determining 
the size of a 
person’s 
income. 
           
 
 
 
We will now ask you a more specific question about the current situation in Norway. 
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"1" means that you completely agree with the statement to the left, "10" means that you 
completely agree with the statement to the right. The numbers in between specify to what 
degree you agree or disagree with the each of the statements respectively. 
Please answer the question below. Mark the number on the scale that you think reflects your 
view the best. 
 
1: In the 
current 
situation in 
Norway we 
should do 
more to even 
out income 
inequality. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10: In the 
current 
situation in 
Norway we 
should do less 
to even out 
income 
inequality. 
           
 
 
 
 
Please answer all the questions below: 
1. A bat and a ball cost 110 NOK in total. The bat costs 100 NOK more than 
the ball. What is the price of the ball?  
2. 5 machines spend 5 minutes making 5 things, how long will it take for 100 
machines to make 100 things?  
3. Parts of a lake are covered by water lilies. Every day this area is doubled. If 
it takes 48 days to cover the whole lake is with water lilies, how long will it take 
to cover half the lake with water lilies?  
 
[Additional questions on age, gender, educational degree pursued (bachelor/master/other), 
and political views.] 
Everyone has now answered the questions and we will therefore continue to the payment 
procedure.  
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Payment 
All questions have been answered and you will soon get an overview of your own personal 
payment. When you are finished looking at the payment you can click on the link below 
taking you to another screenshot showing your personal payment code. You will write down 
the code on the piece of paper lying next to you. Make sure you write the code correctly as 
this identifies the payment you will get at the end of the experiment.  
[Leader opens payment page.] 
When you are finished writing down the codes, we will wait for the envelopes with the 
payments to be brought here before we can start handing them out. In the meantime we ask 
you to remain seated quietly without communicating.  
[Envelopes arrive and the person who prepared them leaves the room.] 
Before we start handing out, let me take this opportunity to say thank you for taking part in 
this experiment. Your contribution is very important for our research. We will also ask you 
not to talk to others about this experiment until the end of the day as we arrange multiple 
sessions. Thank you very much! 
You will now get the envelopes with your payments.  
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A2 – The Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann-Whitney) 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test, or the Mann-Whitney test, is a non-parametric test for testing 
whether two groups differ on a variable (Wild & Seber, 1999). It is used when we cannot use 
a parametric test because we cannot assume normal distribution of the data or equal 
variances, or if the data are measurements on an ordinal scale. Another advantage of this test 
compared to a two-sample t-test, is that it is much less sensitive to outliers.  
Simply put, this test looks at the order of the observations from the two samples. In this case, 
all observations are ranked according to inequality, with the most equal distribution getting 
the rank 1, the second most equal getting the rank 2, and so on. Then all the ranks are 
summed for the two groups, and we look at the difference between these two sums when we 
have controlled for the sample sizes. For a given sample size, one can calculate the expected 
rank sum for a sample under the null hypothesis that the two samples are equal. The more 
the reported rank sum deviates from the expected sum, the more likely it is that the null 
hypothesis is false. 
1) Is the inequality for NC and NO different? 
Stata output: 
Treatment N Rank sum Expected 
NO 145 18295 20735 
NC 140 22460 20020 
Combined 285 40755 40755 
 
Anadjusted variance:   483816.67 
Adjustment for ties:   -74397.34 
  ---------- 
Adjusted variance:     409419.32 
H0: Inequality(NC) = Inequality(NO) 
z =  -3.813 
Prob > |z| =   0.0001   
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 Reject H0 about equal inequality. Inequality under NC is significantly larger than under 
NO at a 1 per cent level.  
 
2) Is the inequality for FC and NO different? 
Stata output: 
Treatment N Rank sum Expected 
NO 145 18754.5 20517.5 
FC 137 21148.5 19385.5 
Combined 282 39903 39903 
 
Unadjusted variance   468482.92 
Adjustment for ties   -82807.68 
---------- 
Adjusted variance     385675.23 
H0: Inequality(FC) = Inequality(NO) 
z =  -2.839 
Prob > |z| =   0.0045 
 Reject H0 about equal inequality. Inequality under FC is significantly larger than under 
NO at the 1 per cent level.  
